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SUMMARY 
A resilient team would be proficient at overcoming sudden, unexpected changes by 
displaying a rapid, adaptive response to maintain effectiveness. To quantify resilience, I 
analyzed data from two different experiments examining performance of human-autonomy 
teams (HATs) operating in a remotely piloted aircraft system (RPAS). Across both 
experiments, the HATs experienced  a variety of automation and autonomy failure 
perturbations using a Wizard of Oz paradigm. Team performance was measured by the 
successful completion of simulated reconnaissance missions, a mission level team 
performance score, a coordination-based target processing efficiency (TPE) score to 
quantify team efficiency, and a ground truth resilience score (GTRS) to measure how teams 
performed during and following a failure. Different layers, composed of vehicle, operator 
controls, communication, and overall system layers, of sociotechnical elements of the 
system were measured across RPAS missions. To measure resilience, I used entropy and a 
root mean squared error (RMSE) metric across all system layers. I used these measures to 
examine the time taken to achieve extreme values of reorganization during a failure and 
the novelty of the reorganization, respectively, to quantify resilience. I hypothesized that 
faster times to achieve extreme values of reorganization during a failure would be 
correlated with all performance measures. Across both experiments, I found negative 
correlations of time taken to achieve extreme values of reorganization and novelty of 
reorganization with team performance measured using TPE, and positive correlations 
while using GTRS. Additionally, I found that teams displayed more reorganization in 
response to failures, but this was not pronounced for effective teams. In Experiment 2, I 
 xi 
also found differential effects of training in the communication and control layers. These 
results can help inform the measurement and training of resilience in HATs through 
targeted team training, feedback, and real-time analysis applications. 








CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
A resilient team responds to unexpected conditions or challenges, such as system 
failures, in a rapid, effective, and efficient way while maintaining high levels of team 
performance in response to and following a failure (Morgan et al., 2017; Alliger et al., 
2015).  An effective team accomplishes high levels of performance in a goal-directed team 
task, such that team members utilize their individual and shared resources to accomplish 
the goals (Salas et al., 2008). Resilient teams respond rapidly to recognize, design, and 
implement changes needed to ward off unexpected challenges to team effectiveness 
(Hoffman & Hancock, 2017). Examples of the lack of team resilience include the 1996 
Mount Everest climbing disaster, at least partially attributable to a breakdown of team 
coordination (Kayes, 2004) and the delayed response to Hurricane Katrina (Leonard & 
Howitt, 2006), in which a more rapid and adaptive response may have helped to improve 
relief and aid and the subsequent recovery of those impacted by the storm surge (Colten et 
al., 2008). In these instances, a more resilient team response would have resulted in faster 
diagnoses of impending catastrophes, implementing needed changes (i.e., reorganization 
behavior), and would thus be able to more rapidly recover from threats to team 
effectiveness. 
 Emergency response team behavior in response to unexpected conditions in 
aviation and other power system failures are well-researched (Woods et al., 1988). I will 
build on this research by applying a data-driven approach to measuring team resilience 
with the potential for real-time analysis that can provide training, feedback, and identify 
critical sources of team and system reorganization critical for team resilience. In particular, 
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I will focus on the issue of human-autonomy teaming, which increasingly applies to many 
different domains including urban search and rescue (Krujiff et al., 2014), uninhabited 
aerial systems (McNeese et al., 2017), cyberspace operations (Tambe et al., 1999), and 
self-driving autonomous vehicles (Campbell et al., 2010). The need for resilience in these 
settings is high because a resilient team would be better equipped to overcome potential 
pitfalls associated with unpredictable challenges in human autonomy teams (HATs) such 
as automation and autonomy failures, by enabling flexible, adaptive, and rapid team 
responses (Hoffman & Hancock, 2017; Hollnagel, Woods & Leveson, 2007). Many of the 
common pitfalls among HATs as described by Shively, Lachter, Brandt, et al., (2017) are 
associated with brittleness, lack of transparency, miscalibrated trust, and a lack of shared 
awareness. For example, a human working with an autonomous agent may lack shared 
situation awareness with autonomous agents, but a resilient HAT would be more likely to 
overcome an error that may result from this lack of shared awareness. 
 I describe a method to measure team resilience to unexpected technological system 
failures (i.e. situational automation and autonomy failures), by focusing on team 
reorganization associated with these failures. In this context, reorganization refers to how 
a team dynamically alters its patterns of interaction, communication, and coordination 
across human and technological components in real time to adapt to changing task 
conditions and overcome system failures. This method takes a systems approach to team 
resilience wherein adaptive solutions must be organized across operators (human and 
synthetic), user interfaces, and RPAS vehicle systems to overcome failures. 
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1.1 Systems Approach 
Resilience engineering is relevant to the training and development of effective teams 
across a large variety of disciplines and applied settings. Resilience engineering 
emphasizes how systems of varying sizes, from teams to large organizations, are expected 
to encounter disturbances, errors, and perturbations, and how these systems must be 
flexible and adaptive to maintain peak levels of performance and effectiveness (Hollnagel, 
Woods, & Leveson, 2007). I will focus on developing a method to analyze team resilience 
using this systems perspective. I hope to add to the literature on resilience engineering by 
describing a bottom-up, data driven approach to quantify and visualize team resilience that 
has the potential for real-time feedback applications for maintaining peak levels of team 
performance under perturbation. To this purpose, I will attempt to quantify team resilience 
by analyzing data from an RPAS HAT synthetic task environment using measures based 
in dynamical systems theory. Another goal is to integrate the dynamical systems-based 
methods with other concepts of team resilience in the human factors and resilience 
engineering community. 
In resilience engineering, resilience is defined as the “systemic capacity to change 
[i.e., reorganize] because of circumstances that push the system beyond the [current] 
boundaries of its competence envelope” (Hoffman & Hancock, 2017, pp. 565-566). The 
RPAS task is appropriate for analyzing team resilience because it allows for the controlled 
introduction of different types of technology failures, generally referred to as perturbations, 
which are defined as external forces that require the system to be reorganized to remain in 
a stable state and that force teams to operate beyond the boundaries of their initial training 
(Gorman, Cooke, & Amazeen, 2010). I will analyze team resilience in the context of the 
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application of perturbations in the form of system failures, as well as the ability of teams 
to adapt to and overcome failure perturbations. 
 I will focus on the coordinated behavior that emerges from individual level 
interactions, as opposed to the individual level actions themselves (Amazeen & Amazeen, 
2017). I view teams as complex adaptive systems (McGrath, Arrow, & Berdahl, 2000) and 
focus on system level measures that account for system complexity that arises due to 
interaction. When examining the coordinated behavior of human and technological 
components of a system, resilience can be viewed as the ability for components to mutually 
adapt while encountering unexpected perturbations and quickly recover to maintain stable 
and effective system performance. Thus, resilience involves maintaining system 
performance across human and technological components to maintain a stable trajectory 
directed toward accomplishing team goals (Gorman, Amazeen, & Cooke, 2010; Thorén, 
2014). The time course of a system to re-stabilize or stabilize in a new state following a 
perturbation is called relaxation time (Trotsky et al., 2012). Thus, my research on resilience 
will focus on the dynamic processes through which systems adapt and recover following 
perturbation in the form of relaxation time (Mermin, 1970; Abraham & Shaw, 1992). In 
this case, I will use relaxation time measures to measure how long it takes a HAT to 
reorganize following autonomy, automation, and other high-level system failure 
perturbations and to identify which system sublayers reorganize. 
1.2 The Current Studies 
To measure resilience, I will use relaxation time metrics based on a nonlinear 
prediction algorithm (Kantz & Schreiber, 1997) and layered dynamics (Gorman, Demir, 
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Cooke, & Grimm, 2019). Specifically, I will quantify how much a team reorganizes its 
behavior in response to a perturbation, how rapidly, and which system layers (operator 
communication; controls; vehicle) reorganize during a failure perturbation. To examine 
how these measures of team resilience are associated with maintaining team effectiveness, 
I will correlate them with objective team performance metrics. These performance metrics 
include an outcome team performance score, a processing efficiency score, and a binary 
score of whether the team overcame the failure. I will also correlate the dynamical systems 
resilience measures with a ground truth resilience score, which measures the change in 
efficiency of taking photos of ground targets (the primary goal of RPAS missions) 
following different types of failure perturbations. Specifically, I will use these team 
performance metrics and ground truth resilience score to provide criterion validity for the 
relaxation time team resilience metrics using data collected from two HAT RPAS 
experiments. 
 My first hypothesis examines how relaxation time metrics relate to maintaining 
team effectiveness during failure perturbations. Shorter relaxation times, which indicate 
faster adaptation and recovery, should be associated with higher team performance. 
• Hypothesis 1: Team effectiveness (higher performance scores) will be positively 
associated with faster relaxation times (greater resilience) across both experiments 
My second hypothesis is that teams should exhibit significantly more reorganization 
behavior during failure perturbations compared to nominal mission conditions during 
which there are no failures. Furthermore, I hypothesize that difference will be larger for 
more effective teams.  
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• Hypothesis 2: Teams will reorganize more following a failure perturbation 
compared to mission segments without perturbations, and this will be more 
pronounced for more effective (higher performance score) teams. 
In one of the experiments (Experiment 2), teams received different types of training to 
help them overcome either automation failure perturbations (coordination coaching) or 
autonomy failure perturbations (trust calibration), with a third group receiving no special 
training (control). I hypothesize that my resilience measures will be sensitive to these 
different training types, such that resilience will be higher for automation failures for teams 
that received coordination coaching and resilience will be higher for autonomy failures for 
teams that received trust calibration training. 
• Hypothesis 3: In Experiment 2, there will be training effects on resilience. Teams 
trained in the coordination coaching condition will display more resilience 
following automation failures and teams trained in the trust calibration condition 
will display greater resilience to autonomy failures. 
Finally, I will test the criterion validity of my resilience measures using a ground truth 
resilience score. I anticipate that more resilient teams will display both higher ground truth 
resilience scores as well as faster relaxation times using the dynamical system resilience 
measures. 
• Hypothesis 4: Teams with better ground truth resilience scores will also have 
faster relaxation times.  
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CHAPTER 2. GENERAL METHOD 
2.1 Overview 
 Results will be reported from data across two experiments conducted at the 
Cognitive Engineering Research Institute (CERI) located the Arizona State University-
Polytechnic campus. These data are from the Cognitive Engineering Research on Team 
Tasks RPAS Synthetic Task Environment (CERTT-RPAS-STE), which simulates 
teamwork components of RPAS operations and allows for system level evaluations of these 
components. The two experiments both use the CERTT-RPAS-STE task, but differ with 
respect to training conditions and types of failure perturbations. 
2.2 Materials 
2.2.1 CERTT Lab 
 The CERTT-RPAS-STE consists of seven hardware consoles (three for task roles, 
and four for experimenters) in which all participants and experimenters use a chat interface 
to communicate (McNeese et al., 2018; Grimm et al., 2018). The task consists of three 
different roles for each of three team members: (1) the navigator creates the flight plan and 
sends relevant information (e.g., altitude, airspeed, waypoint name, and effective radius) 
to the pilot and photographer; (2) the pilot manages and adjusts vehicle altitude, heading, 
and airspeed based on the flight plan, and maintains fuel, gears and flaps settings as needed; 
additionally, the pilot negotiates with the photographer to achieve optimal levels of altitude 
and airspeed to enable successful photographs of target waypoints; and (3) the 
photographer adjusts camera settings to ensure proper settings for a successful photograph, 
takes target photos, and communicates these results to the navigator and pilot. The goal of 
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the three heterogeneous and interdependent team members is to take photographs of 
strategic target waypoints in the RPAS environment during a series of 40-minute missions. 
In the current studies, the pilot is portrayed as a synthetic teammate capable of flying the 
RPA and communicating with the other team members via chat. 
The synthetic teammate project (Ball et al., 2010) involves the development of an 
ACT-R based synthetic teammate. Some prior experiments have utilized the ACT-R 
synthetic teammate, and some have utilized a human teammate in a Wizard of Oz (WoZ) 
paradigm (Demir et al., 2014; 2019) in order to enact specific failures on the part of the 
synthetic teammate. Prior work with the synthetic agent revealed limitations in the agent’s 
communication, coordination, and interaction capabilities, which were replicated in the 
WoZ paradigm (Demir et al., 2019; Grimm et al., 2019). The current experiments both 
used this WoZ paradigm. 
2.3 Procedure 
2.3.1 Task and Roles 
The navigator and the photographer were informed that the pilot was a synthetic 
agent, although the synthetic agent was really a trained experimenter (WoZ). This synthetic 
pilot communicated and coordinated with the human participants with a restricted 
vocabulary and introduced autonomy failure perturbations at prespecified targets over a 
series of 40 min RPAS missions. The human participants (navigator and photographer) 
were given cheat sheets to assist in effective communication with the synthetic pilot. 
2.4 Measures 
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2.4.1 Performance Metrics 
I analyzed team effectiveness using three different performance metrics. Team 
Performance is a mission-level outcome score of team effectiveness, which emphasizes 
overall ability to successfully take target photos while accounting for other mission 
parameters such as resource usage, time spent in alarm states, rate of good photographs, 
missed targets, and amount of fuel and battery consumed. Teams started each mission with 
a score of 1,000 and points are deducted based on the parameters. Overcome measures how 
many failures the teams successfully overcame (i.e., successfully photographed the target 
affected by the failure). If the team overcame the failure, then they received a 1, and if they 
failed to overcome the failure, they received a 0 for that failure. Finally, Target Processing 
Efficiency (TPE) measures performance by focusing on target-level parameters, including 
time spent in effective radius (lower times are more efficient). For example, a greater 
amount of time spent in effective radius would lead to a larger score deduction. Higher 
scores correspond to more efficient target processing. Team Performance and Overcome 
are outcome-based measures, whereas TPE is a process-based measure, as it deducts points 
for inefficient team process. 
2.4.2 Ground Truth Resilience Score 
The ground truth resilience score (GTRS) is a process-based measure of team 
resilience based on TPE scores. I will utilize the GTRS to analyze how well a team 
performs not only on the target directly affected by a failure but also how well they perform 
on the subsequent target following a failure. Conceptually, GTRS measures not only how 
much a team is affected by a failure but also how well a team recovers from a failure (i.e., 
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how resilient a team is following a failure). This score will be the range (difference score) 
between the TPE score on the failure target and the TPE score on the following (non-
perturbed) target: 
𝐺𝑇𝑅𝑆 =  𝑇𝑆𝑓+1 − 𝑇𝑆𝑓 
where, 
𝐺𝑇𝑅𝑆  = ground truth resilience score, 
𝑇𝑆𝑓+1  = TPE score on the target immediately following the failure target 
𝑇𝑆𝑓  = TPE score on the failure target 
  
For example, in Experiment 1, during Mission 2, there is an automation failure on the 3rd 
target. The ground truth resilience score (𝐺𝑇𝑅𝑆) would then be the difference between the 
4th target TPE (𝑇𝑆𝑓+1) and the 3
rd target TPE (𝑇𝑆𝑓). 
Whereas GTRS was intended to specifically relate to resilient behavior by 
measuring how well the team recovers from a failure, it does not directly inform us how 
this occurs. For example, if TPE is greatly reduced by a failure, but TPE on the subsequent 
target returns to a high level, then GTRS would be large, and this would fit the classic 
definition of resilience to disruption. In this case, we would expect a negative correlation 
between larger GTRS and shorter relaxation times. On the other hand, if a team reorganizes 
so quickly (shorter relaxation time) that TPE on the failure target remains high, and TPE 
on the subsequent target also remains high, then GTRS would be small, and this would fit 
a definition of resilience associated with robustness to perturbation. In this case, we would 
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expect a positive correlation between smaller GTRS and shorter relaxation times. This 
interpretation difficulty with GTRS will be addressed in the Discussion section. 
2.5 Dynamical Systems Resilience Measures 
2.5.1 Layered Dynamics 
I analyze four aspects of RPAS coordination identified in prior research as system 
layers (Gorman et al., 2019) that represent HAT coordination in terms of reorganization. 
System layers include: (1) communications layer - message sending and receiving among 
team members through the chat system (e.g., pilot → navigator, navigator → photographer, 
etc.); (2) vehicle layer – actions and states of vehicle and vehicle systems (e.g., speed, 
altitude, fuel, etc.); (3) control layer – the controls used to interface with the vehicle and 
other teammates (e.g., pilot’s heading control, photographer’s camera controls, etc.); and 
(4) the system layer – combined state across all system layers. A collection of symbolic 
signals represents the distribution of activity across components in each layer as a vector 
over time (1 Hz). The overall RPAS vector is a 38-component vector, composed of 9 
components each for the communication and vehicle layers, and 20 components for the 
controls layer (Figure 1). The symbolic representation is determined by mapping the 
continuous dynamics of components (e.g., vehicle speed) onto a numeric alphabet for 
symbolic time series modeling (Nicolis & Prigogine, 1989) that preserves the invariants of 
the phase space (e.g., vehicle speed can be represented as speeding up, slowing down, 
constant, and alarm state; Gorman et al., 2019). The purpose of using symbolic dynamics 
is that by defining the symbols as mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive symbol 
sets, we can sum across any symbol sets (e.g., vehicle layer and communication layer) to 
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identify changes in set intersections that uniquely identify changes in system state and that 
allow for the efficient computation of system reorganization on a second by second basis 
(Gorman et al., 2019). 
 
Figure 1. Input signal for layers. Input signals for the Vehicle, Controls, and 
Communication layers. Non-underlined signals in the Vehicle provided 
redundant/invariant information and were not used. Figure adapted from (Gorman, 
Demir, Cooke, & Grimm, 2019). 
As illustrated in Figure 2, the symbols are numeric representations to allow for 
summation (intersection) that can represent all possible permutations of system state across 
system layers; however, I do not assume that any ordinal relations (e.g., greater than) exist 
among the symbol sets. Next, I summed down each vector (i.e., take the intersection) to 
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obtain a univariate symbol corresponding to each respective layer and summed over all 
vectors for overall system state at each second. The result is a symbolic time series that 
captures changing system state as well as layer states at a 1Hz sampling rate. I analyzed 
moving window entropy time series (a measure of system variety; Ashby, 1957) of each of 
these layers to measure the continuous reorganization at each system layer and across the 
system overall. 
Component Sample (1 Hz) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Left Turn (𝒒𝟏) 407 000 000 000 000 000 407 000 
Right Turn (𝒒𝟐) 000 000 000 000 462 000 000 000 
Altitude Change 
(𝒒𝟑) 
000 000 100 100 100 000 000 000 
Airspeed Change 
(𝒒𝟒) 
200 200 200 000 000 000 000 000 
Layer State (Q’) 607 200 300 100 562 000 407 000 
Figure 2. Illustration of the summation procedure using a subset of components from the 
vehicle layer. The symbolic time series represent simplified on-off component states (e.g., 
qi represents the activation of a component or not, e.g. 𝑞1= 407 indicates left turn; 000 = 
no action)  and overall layer state (Q’ = component intersection). This is obtained by 
summing across all component states at each time point. Time points in which a component 
is active are highlighted. 
2.5.2 Entropy 
Entropy is one measure of reorganization, and it is used here due to its 
computational efficiency relative to other measures (Gorman et al., 2020). I calculated 
information entropy across system layers using a moving window approach, to measure 
how much the system is reorganizing at each 1Hz window update. This approach quantifies 
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the change in the variety of possible arrangements the system occupies over time. The more 
permutations of symbols and set intersections a layer goes through within a fixed amount 
of time, the greater the entropy and the greater the reorganization. Fluctuations in the 
entropy time series correspond to high system reorganization (high entropy) vs. low system 
reorganization (low entropy) across the time series. Shannon’s entropy formula (Shannon 
& Weaver, 1949) was used to calculate entropy, and entropy was calculated repeatedly as 
a 120-second moving window was slid across the layered dynamics symbolic time series: 
 
In the above equation, pn is the relative frequency of any system state (i.e., intersection), 
here represented by symbol n, multiplied by the log2 𝑝𝑛 value. I hypothesized (Hypothesis 
2) that larger entropy quantities would represent greater system reorganization in response 
to failure perturbations (i.e., the law of requisite variety; Ashby, 1957). 
2.5.3 Nonlinear Prediction Error 
I used the nonlinear prediction algorithm from Kantz and Schreiber (1997) to detect 
novel reorganizations in response to failures in the form of significant departures from 
predicted system trajectories. Using the entropy reorganization time series, I select an 
observation, defined as 𝑥𝑁, and define a nearest-neighbor neighborhood, 𝑈ζ(𝑥𝑁) around 
the point 𝑥𝑁, as all previous observations 𝑥𝑛 that come within ε of 𝑥𝑁, where ε is a noise 
factor.  Next, I generate predictions from 𝑥𝑁 to a set of future points denoted by 𝑥𝑁+∆𝑛, by 
taking the points in  𝑈ζ(𝑥𝑁), denoted by 𝑥𝑛𝑖, and following them ΔN time steps, to calculate 





a set of predictions, 𝑥𝑛𝑖+∆𝑛. Rather than arbitrarily choosing any one prediction, I then 
calculate the ensemble average across the set of predictions,〈𝑥𝑛𝑖+∆𝑛〉 to calculate how much 
the current trajectory deviates from the predicted trajectory using root mean squared error 
(RMSE), √(𝑥𝑁+∆𝑛 − 〈𝑥𝑛𝑖+∆𝑛〉). RMSE represents how far the current trajectory of 
reorganization deviates from the predicted reorganization trajectory based on prior 
reorganizations of the system. Figure 3 illustrates the calculation of nonlinear prediction 
error and RMSE to measure novel reorganization. For the current studies, ε = 3 entropy 
units and Δ = 20 s (Gorman et al., 2019; Grimm et al., 2017). 
 
Figure 3. Depiction of the algorithm used to calculate RMSE. Larger deviations between 
“Raw” and “Expected” data yield larger RMSE values. Figure is a revised version of work 
originally presented in Grimm et al. (2017). 
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I generated corresponding time series of RMSE values for each RPAS mission using the 
same moving window technique described previously for entropy. In terms of the novelty 
of a reorganization, the RMSE time series quantifies the degree to which a reorganization 
deviates from all prior reorganizations. 
2.5.4 Relaxation Time Metrics 
Relaxation time will be used to quantify resilience. Previous methods to studying 
team adaptation involve introducing some type of perturbation to the team process to 
determine how the team responds to the perturbation through overt communication 
(Gorman et al., 2020; Grimm et al., 2017). System reorganization time, here referred to as 
relaxation time, is another way to analyze this type of team response across system layers 
and at the overall system level. Relaxation time is the time it takes for a system to 
reorganize and restabilize or stabilize in a new state following a perturbation. If a team 
achieves this quickly, then it has a fast relaxation time, which is here defined as greater 
resilience, which will be validated against the performance metrics and GTRS. I will 
measure relaxation time by quantifying how long it takes to reach statistically extreme 
levels of reorganization and novel reorganization, quantified using entropy and RMSE, 
respectively, relative to different types of failure perturbations including automation, 
autonomy, and other system failures described later. The first relaxation time metric is 
referred to as Initial Relaxation Time. This is simply how long it takes the team’s 
reorganization value to exceed a 99% confidence interval threshold (described in more 
detail later). The next measure is Peak Relaxation Time, which is how long it takes 
reorganization to reach its highest value following a perturbation. The Initial measure 
operationalizes how adaptive and quick the team is to generate a response to a failure, since 
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this represents the first point in time in which reorganization reaches an extreme value. The 
Peak measure operationalizes how quickly the team reaches its maximum point of 
reorganization. This also emphasizes adaptivity but more so the length of the adaptive 
response. To draw a parallel to the work by Hoffman and Hancock (2017), the Initial 
measure represents the time to recognize a need for a change and enact a change, while the 
Peak measure represents the time to implement a change.  The final relaxation time 
measure, End, represents how long it takes for the system to return to stability or reach a 
new stable state. The End metric is represented as the last point in time in which the team 
is operating at extreme levels of reorganization, thus closing the “resilience curve” that is 
the comprised of the initial adaptation, peak adaptation, and ending resilience components. 
For all three relaxation time metrics I will only look for significant values relative to a 
failure perturbation and within the failure timeframe, or specific time duration in which the 
failures occurred. Figure 4 illustrates these metrics, and Table 1 describes how they relate 
to each other. 
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Figure 4. An illustration of the Initial, Peak, and End relaxation time metrics 
Table 1. Relaxation Time Metrics 
Metric Definition Construct 
Initial First time to reach a 
significant (extreme) level 
of reorganization by 
crossing a significance 
threshold 
Adaptation and enaction; 
time taken for a team to 
enact reorganization 
behavior following a failure 
Peak Time taken to reach 
greatest amount of 
reorganization 
Adaptation; time to display 
greatest amount of 
reorganization behavior 
following a failure 
End Time to return below 
extreme levels of 
reorganization 
Long term resilience, 
recovery; time taken to 
return to stable levels of 
functioning following a 
failure 
Note: Description of different Relaxation Time Metrics corresponding to different time 
points (Initial, Peak, and End) with corresponding definitions and constructs. 
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2.6 Data Analysis 
To analyze the statistical significance of entropy and RMSE at the 99% level, I will 
use a one-way test of significance. Focusing on the distribution of observations within the 
timespan of a failure, I will identify observations that exceed the 99th percentile of the 
observations within the timespan of that failure, corresponding to a 0.01 alpha level (Cohen 
et al., 2013). By focusing on the distribution of observations within the duration of a failure, 
I will identify all three extreme values of the relaxation time resilience metrics (i.e., Initial, 
Peak, and End). 
CHAPTER 3. EXPERIMENT 1 
3.1 Participants 
There were 22 teams (44 participants) aged between 18 to 36 years of age (M = 
23.0, SD = 3.90), with a gender distribution of 21 males and 23 females. All participants 
were recruited from Arizona State University and surrounding areas. Participants were 
required to have normal-to-corrected vision and fluency in English. All participants were 
compensated $10 per hour. 
3.2 Procedure 
Experiment 1 took place across two sessions, with a one- to two-week interval between 
sessions. A highly trained experimenter was placed in the pilot role and performed as the 
synthetic teammate in a WoZ paradigm, with this experimenter mimicking actions 
consistent with the synthetic teammate. The participants were randomly assigned to the 
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other roles (navigator and photographer) and were instructed that they were working with 
a synthetic teammate. The experimenter (in the synthetic pilot role) was in one room, and 
the participants were located together in another room (separated from the experimenter), 
separated by a partition. 
Before the task began, each team received role related training on the task and their 
roles (30 minutes of PowerPoint training). The experimenters subsequently used a checklist 
to ensure that the navigator and the photographer were sufficiently trained in their roles as 
they performed a hands-on practice mission (30 minutes for hands-on training). The first 
40-minute mission was a baseline mission with no failures. From Missions 2 to 9, there 
were two failures (one automation and one autonomy failure) per mission. For example, in 
the second mission, an automation Type I failure (failure types are described later) was 
implemented during the second target, and an autonomy Type I failure was implemented 
during the fourth target. A malicious cyberattack was implemented during the final 10 
minutes of the last mission. See Table 2 for the details of target implementation.  
Table 2. Procedure for Experiment 1 
  Application of Failures During Specific Targets 


































Consent (15 min)    
Training- PowerPoint 
+ Hands On 
No Failure No Failure No Failure 
Mission I (40 min) No Failure No Failure No Failure 
NASA TLX (15 min)    
Mission 2 (40 min) 2nd/Type I 4th/Type I No Failure 
Mission 3 (40 min) 4th/Type II 2nd/Type II No Failure 
Mission 4 (40 min) 1st/Type III 3rd/Type III No Failure 





   




( T o t a l S e s s i o n
 
w i t h
 




h o u r s ) Mission 5 (40 min) 2nd/Type III 4th/Type II No Failure 
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(Table 2 Continued) 
NASA TLX I (15 
min) 
   
Mission 6 (40 min) 4th/Type I 2nd/Type I No Failure 
Mission 7 (40 min) 1st/Type II 3rd/Type II No Failure 
Mission 8 (40 min) 3rd/Type III 1st/Type III No Failure 
Mission 9 (40 min) 3rd/Type II 1st/Type III No Failure 
Mission 10 (40 min) 2nd/Type III 4th/Type III Last 10 min 
NASA TLX-II, Trust, 
Anthropomorphism, 
Demographics, and 
Debriefing (30 min) 
   
Post-Check Procedure 
(15 min) 
   
 
Note: Automation and autonomy failures were implemented in a specified order. 
Malicious attack occurred in the last ten minutes (Grimm, Demir, Gorman & Cooke, 
2018). Failure Type is described later. 
 
 
3.3 Failure Perturbations 
Three different types of automation failures and three different types of autonomy 
failures were introduced. The failure conditions impacted the following information: 
current and next waypoint information, distance from target waypoint, and time to target 
waypoint. There was also a malicious failure attack in the final 10 minutes of the final 
mission. However, because this failure was unique and only occurred once across the 
course of the entire experiment, I deemed this too small of a sample to contribute towards 
the analysis of Experiment 1. I will describe the malicious attack failure in more detail for 
Experiment 2. 
3.3.1 Automation Failures 
The Type I Automation Failure affected the photographer’s task screen for a total 
duration of 300 sec. This prevented the photographer from being able to see current and 
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next waypoint information, remaining time, distance to current target, bearing, and course 
deviation to current target, such that the other team members had to provide that 
information to the photographer in order to take the photograph. The Type II Automation 
Failure affected the pilot’s task screen for a total duration of 420 sec. This prevented the 
pilot from seeing current altitude and airspeed settings, and from entering new altitude and 
airspeed information, such that the pilot had to get that information by communicating with 
other team members. The Type III Automation failure also affected the pilot’s task screen 
for a duration of 420 sec. This failure was more intense than the Type II automation failure 
because additionally, the pilot was unable to see remaining time, distance, and bearing to 
the current target waypoint. To overcome the Type III failure, the pilot had to communicate 
with other team members to obtain accurate target information. For example, rather than 
relying on the display, the pilot must get updated course bearing information related to the 




Figure 5. Example of a Type III automation failure. The pilot cannot see Altitude, Airspeed, 
Time to target, Distance to target, and Course Bearing. 
3.3.2 Autonomy Failures 
 The experiment included three types of autonomy failures, in which the synthetic 
pilot failed, all lasting 420 seconds. The Type I Autonomy Failure was a comprehension 
failure. The human team member provides information to the synthetic agent, but the 
synthetic agent repeatedly asks the same question due to its limited communication 
abilities. The Type II Autonomy Failure was an anticipation failure. This is when the 
synthetic agent does not give the photographer enough time to take a good photo and 
unexpectedly proceeds to the next target due to a failure to properly anticipate the needs of 
the human teammate. The Type III Autonomy Failure was another type of comprehension 
failure but with more complications. In this autonomy failure, the synthetic agent fails to 
understand a message because of its limited communication abilities and limited language 
repertoire. As a result, the synthetic agent misinterprets information from the navigator and 
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photographer with respect to target waypoints. Consequently, the synthetic agent fails to 
perform the required actions to take a good photo. 
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Hypothesis 1 
The results for Experiment 1 are summarized in Table 3. This includes information 
pertaining to the relaxation time correlations with the various outcome measures, layers, as 
well as when they occurred (Initial, Peak, End), referred to as Time Point. I report all 
significant findings at the 𝛼 =  .05 level. Alpha would be very small if I were to apply a 
Bonferroni correction. For instance, for Experiment 1, I would be computing 192 different 
correlations (2 failure types x 2 dynamical system measures x 4 outcome measures x 4 
layers x 3 time points) for a Bonferroni-corrected 𝛼 =  
.05
192
 =  .0003.  Thus, I would be 
more likely to have Type II errors, given that the Bonferroni corrected 𝛼 would be so small, 
that I would almost never be able to reject the null hypothesis. To overcome this limitation, 
I will focus on effect sizes in line with the new statistics approach (Cumming, 2014; 
Cumming, 2012). Therefore, I focus on correlations of medium to large sizes, for which |r| 
> .3. By examining effect sizes rather than p-values, I am also able to overcome the 
common problem of null-hypothesis significant testing, that a p-value alone does not 
inform the researcher about the size or importance of an effect (Cumming, 2012). 
Additionally, prior work by Cumming describes how relying on p-values may lead to poor 
replication due to high variability and a wide range of possible p-values, whereas effect 
sizes perform better in replications under simulated conditions (Cumming, 2014; 
Cumming, 2008; Cumming & Maillardet, 2006). 
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Table 3. Experiment 1 Results 
Failure Type Dynamical 
Systems 
Measure 
Outcome Measure  Layer Time Point(s) 
Automation 
Failure 
Entropy Ground Truth 
Resilience Score 
(GTRS) 
Vehicle Initial (r = .153, p = .041) 
Team Performance 
(Mission Level) 
Vehicle Initial (r = .205, p = .004) 
Peak (r = .164, p = .023) 
End (r = .153, p = .034) 
Overcome Vehicle Initial (r = .151, p = .041) 
Control Initial (r = .166, p = .022) 
Peak (r = .166, p = .021) 
End (r = .176, p = .015) 
System Initial (r = .161, p = .025) 
Peak (r = .154, p = .033) 
End (r = .146, p = .043) 
RMSE Team Performance 
(Mission Level) 
Vehicle Peak (r = -.160, p = .029) 
End (r = -.162, p = .027) 
Control Initial (r = -.158, p = .031) 
Peak (r = .159, p = .031) 
End (r = .151, p = .040) 
 Overcome  System Initial (r = .172, p = .019) 
Peak (r = .173, p = .018)  




Entropy Target Processing 
Efficiency (TPE) 
Vehicle Initial (r = -.309, p <.001)** 
Peak (r = -.330, p < .001)** 
End (r = -.328, p < .001)** 
System Initial (r = -.277, p <.001)** 
Peak (r = -.254, p = .001)* 




Vehicle Initial (r = .288, p =.001)* 
Peak (r = .191, p = .025) 
End (r = .191, p = .025) 
System Initial (r = .262, p = .002)* 
Peak (r = .249, p =.003)* 
End (r = .270, p =.001)* 
RMSE Overcome Communication End (r = -.159, p = .040) 
Note: Significant correlations of relaxation time metrics with outcome measures. Medium 
to large correlations are in bold, with asterisks denoting the following:*p < .01, **p < .001. 
 26 
Based on these results, I found correlations of medium sizes for autonomy failures 
using entropy, indicating an association of rapid reorganization behavior with TPE. The 
significant results during the automation failures do not satisfy the medium-to-large effect 
size criteria. However, for the entropy measure during autonomy failures, it is apparent that 
the vehicle layer produces relatively consistent and interpretable correlations in the 
hypothesized negative direction when correlating relaxation times with TPE. Although the 
vehicle layer produces medium correlations of a magnitude greater than .3, the system layer 
approaches that medium effect size, also in the hypothesized direction. Interestingly, I 
found the opposite pattern, sizable correlations in the opposite (positive) direction when 
correlating relaxation times with the GTRS.  
3.4.2 Hypothesis 2 
To test Hypothesis 2, that teams display greater reorganization during failure 
perturbations compared to mission segments without perturbations (with a more 
pronounced effect for more effective teams), I calculated separate entropy averages for 
nominal, automation failure, and autonomy failure time segments in each mission.  Due to 
the large combination of missions, teams, and layers, I had a dataset of n = 788 average 
entropy values per failure status (nominal, automation, autonomy) condition. Next, I 
created another team level score using each performance metric: TPE, Team Performance, 
and Total Number of Overcome Failures per team. Upon creating these team level scores, 
I used a hierarchical cluster analysis to identify low, medium, and high performing clusters 
across these performance variables and identified these as performance clusters. Finally, I 
conducted a 3 (Performance Cluster [Low, Medium, High]) × 3 (Failure Status [Nominal, 
Automation, Autonomy]) split-plot ANOVA. I used Performance Cluster as a between-
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subjects factor and Failure Status as a within-subjects factor because all teams encountered 
all variations of Failure Status. Amount of entropy (reorganization) across all system layers 
and missions was the dependent variable. 
Mauchly’s Test revealed that the assumption of sphericity was violated for the 
within-subjects variable, Failure Status, χ2 (2) = 94.060, p < .001. Using a Greenhouse-
Geisser correction, I found a significant effect of Failure Status, indicating that entropy was 
significantly different across Nominal, Automation Failure, and Autonomy Failure 
statuses, F(1.78, 1237.56) = 49.45, p < .001. Post-hoc comparisons using the Least 
Significant Difference Method revealed that Autonomy Failures displayed significantly 
greater reorganization than Automation Failures (mean difference = .030, p = .003) and 
Nominal Times (mean difference = .085, p < .001), and Automation Failures displayed 
significantly greater entropy than Nominal Times (mean difference = .055, p = .008). 
Figure 6 displays a bar graph of these means. 
  
Figure 6. Main effect of Failure Status on average entropy. Autonomy failure had the 
greatest amount of reorganization, followed by Automation Failure, followed by Nominal. 
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There was no significant effect of Performance Cluster F(2, 697) = .363, p = .695, 
which indicates that the low, medium, and high performing clusters did not differ in their 
average amount of entropy per mission. Finally, the interaction between Failure Status and 
Performance Cluster was not statistically significant F (3.551, 1237.56) = .209, p = .917, 
indicating that low, medium, and high performing teams all exhibited increased entropy 
(reorganization) during failures. 
Taken together, these results support one part of Hypothesis 2, but not the entire 
hypothesis. That is, teams do reorganize more during failures, and there is more 
reorganization for higher level failures (autonomy over automation). However, this effect 
was not more pronounced for more effective teams. 
3.4.3 Hypothesis 4 
As noted above, I found sizable correlations in the positive direction when 
correlating relaxation times with the GTRS. This result may have to do with how well each 
team performed during the failure compared to how they did immediately following the 
failure, which I will address further in the Discussion section, but briefly address here. To 
explore how the TPE scores and GTRS related to one another, I inspected the data from 
the autonomy failures. I found that there were several teams that performed very well 
during the failure and had a small GTRS. Conversely, there were teams which had 
performed poorly on the failure, but scored a high GTRS. Table 4 shows an example of 
one instance in which a team performed well on the failure target, and one instance of a 
team obtaining a low performance score on the failure: 
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Table 4. Autonomy Failures Sample Data 
 TPE on Autonomy 
Failure 
TPE on Target 
Following Failure 
GTRS 
High Performance on 
Autonomy Failure 
938.49 974.24 35.75 
Low Performance on 
Autonomy Failure 
622.4 935.21 312.81 
Note: Sample data for TPE scores on Autonomy Failures to examine the relationship 
between GTRS and the Autonomy Failure resilience. 
Thus, high performing teams display robustness – they immediately handle the 
complexity of the failure very effectively – resulting in a lower GTRS. Conversely, a team 
that did not perform as well on the failure target would have a high GTRS score, because 
the difference between the two target scores is large. If we take into account that shorter 
relaxation times are correlated with higher TPE at the failure target, then it is becomes clear 
why we find the positive relationship between relaxation time and GTRS. To further 
support this interpretation, I calculated the correlation between failure target TPE score and 
GTRS and found a significant negative correlation (r = -.629, p < .001). Thus, this negative 
correlation accounts for the opposite relationships I found between relaxation time and TPE 




CHAPTER 4. EXPERIMENT 2 
4.1 Participants 
In Experiment 2, there were 35 teams (70 participants) aged between 18 to 33 years 
of (M = 22.6, SD = 3.61), with a gender distribution of 52 males and 7 females, with one 
participant choosing not to respond. Like Experiment 1, participants were recruited from 
Arizona State University and surrounding areas and were required to have normal-to-
corrected vision and fluency in English and all participants were compensated $10 per 
hour. 
4.2 Procedure 
Experiment 2 took place over one session. Like Experiment 1, it used the WoZ 
paradigm with a highly trained experimenter in the synthetic pilot role, and the human 
participants randomly assigned to the roles of navigator and photographer, instructed that 
they were working with a synthetic teammate. As in Experiment 1, the experimenter was 
located separately from the participants, with the participants located in the same room, 
separated by a partition. 
 The primary differences between Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 are the training 
condition manipulations (BS) and the introduction of three new types of failures (hybrid, 
system power down, and communication cut; described later). There were three different 
training conditions (Control, Coordination Coaching, and Trust Calibration). The Control 
condition was the standard training used in Experiment 1. In the Coordination Coaching 
condition, participants were trained to push and pull information with the synthetic pilot in 
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a timely manner, which was hypothesized to improve team coordination, performance, and 
situation awareness. Additionally, the hands-on training mission used a “super-AVO” 
(pilot) coach, in which the pilot directed information pushing and pulling coordination 
patterns (e.g., the pilot would request relevant information if a participant did not send it 
in a timely manner). The goal of the Trust Calibration training condition was to properly 
calibrate the humans’ trust in the synthetic agent. During training, they were informed that 
the synthetic teammate was imperfect, which served to calibrate expectations and reduce 
overtrust. During hands-on training, there were minor performance decrements (e.g. the 
synthetic agent had delays), and the human participants were strongly encouraged to be 
persistent in coordinating with the agent. The goal of Trust Calibration training was to 
ensure that the participants were less prone to overtrust and were primed to recognize and 
respond to autonomy failures. Table 5 shows the procedure for Experiment 2. 
Table 5. Procedure for Experiment 2 
 Condition 1: Control Condition 2: Coordination 
Coaching 
Condition 3: Trust 
Calibration 
Consent (15 min)    
Training- PowerPoint 
(40 min) 
Control: Filler Automation: + push/pull Autonomy: calibration of 
expectations 
Training – Hands-on 
(40 min) 
Standard Super-AVO/pilot + 
push/pull coach 
Dumb-AVO/pilot (AF10) 
+ persistence coach 
Mission I (40 min) No Failure No Failure No Failure 
Mission 2 (40 min) 2nd/Automation (Type I) 
4th/Autonomy (Type I) 
2nd/Automation (Type I) 
4th/Autonomy (Type I) 
2nd/Automation (Type I) 
4th/Autonomy (Type I) 
Mission 3 (40 min) 3rd/Automation (Type III) 
1st/Autonomy (Type III) 
3rd/Automation (Type III) 
1st/Autonomy (Type III) 
3rd/Automation (Type III) 
1st/Autonomy (Type III) 
Mission 4 (40 min) 2nd/Hybrid (Automation II 
& Autonomy II) 
4th/Communication 
2nd/Hybrid (Automation II 
& Autonomy II) 
4th/Communication 
2nd/Hybrid (Automation II 
& Autonomy II) 
4th/Communication 
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(Table 5 continued) 
 













Debrief, Trust & 
Anthropomorphism 
Questionnaires 
   
Note: A variety of automation, autonomy, hybrid, communication and system failures were 
implemented in a specified order (Demir et al., 2019). Failure Type is described later. 
 
4.3 Failure Perturbations 
Experiment 2 included an Automation III and Autonomy III failure as previously 
described. Other failures included malicious attacks, hybrid failures, system failures, and 
communication cuts. This section describes these failures in detail. 
4.3.1 Malicious Attacks 
Malicious attacks were introduced during the final ten minutes of the final mission. 
These attacks are a unique type of failure, which result from the synthetic agent being 
hijacked through cyber-attack and the synthetic teammate providing false, malicious 
information detrimental to mission completion. In addition to this false information, the 
synthetic agent purposefully flies to an enemy-designated waypoint, which is evidence to 
the human team members that something is wrong with the pilot. To overcome this failure, 
either the navigator or the photographer must notice that the RPA is off-route and is going 
to an enemy designated area and then inform Intel (an experimenter) via chat message. 
4.3.2 Hybrid Failures 
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 The hybrid failure is a combination of automation and autonomy failures. It is a 
combination of a Type II autonomy failure, and a Type II automation failure from 
Experiment 1. The Type II automation failure affects the pilot screen, and the pilot 
(synthetic teammate) is not able to see the altitude and airspeed for the next target and must 
coordinate with the navigator and photographer to achieve proper airspeed and altitude 
levels. However, this failure continues with a Type II autonomy failure portion. This is an 
anticipation failure, wherein the pilot begins moving to the next waypoint before the 
photographer can take a photo of the current waypoint. The navigator or photographer must 
identify this failure and must communicate to go back to the waypoint (Figure 7). 
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Figure 7. Graphical description of the Hybrid failure. This failure consists of the 
Automation II (altitude & airspeed affected) and Autonomy II (anticipation failure) 
failures. Solutions are described in the right. 
4.3.3 System Power Down Failure 
The system failure simulates a full system power down and reboot during a mission. 
During this failure, there is a gradual power down of all screens over the course of 330 sec. 
The screens power down in order from “least important” to “most important”, and they 
Automation Portion of Hybrid Failure 
 
 
Autonomy Portion of Hybrid Failure 
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return in reverse order. The photographer is still able to take a successful photo (until the 
very last screen is blacked out) if the team adapts their interaction patterns to ensure that 
all necessary information is provided to the affected team member. For instance, the 
navigator’s route and target waypoint information black out very early. An effective change 
to the interaction pattern would involve the navigator quickly contacting either or both 
team member(s) to obtain the lost information. A rapid response is especially important 
because the screens of the other team members will quickly black out as well. The second 
action needed for a successful photo is for the photographer to adjust the light meter 
settings from memory or use trial and error until a good photo is taken. Additionally, if the 
team successfully overcomes the system failure by the photographer taking a good photo, 
the pilot will still be able to navigate to the next waypoint as screens continue to come back 
online. See Appendix A for images of the screens during the System Failure. 
4.3.4 Communication Cut 
The communication cut is a failure in which the communication from the 
photographer → pilot is cut; however, the pilot → photographer link remains active. The 
pilot is unaware of the communication cut since the pilot’s communication with the 
photographer and navigator is still intact. To overcome this failure, the photographer must 
coordinate through the navigator to send the information to the pilot (Figure 8). 
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Figure 8. Demonstration of Communication Cut failure. The top diagram illustrates a normal 
illustration in which the pilot and photographer communicate to ensure a good photo. The bottom 
diagram demonstrates how the photographer overcomes this failure by going through the navigator 
to communicate to the pilot. 
 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Hypothesis 1 
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Table 6 summarizes all the significant correlations found in Experiment 2 across 
all failure types, measures, layers, and relaxation time points. 
Table 6. Experiment 2 Results 
Failure Type Dynamical System 
Measure 
Outcome Measure  Layer Time Point(s) 
Automation 
Failure 
Entropy Target Processing 
Efficiency (TPE) 
Vehicle Initial (r = -.282, p = .026) 
Peak (r = -.281, p = .027) 
End (r = -.285, p = .025) 
RMSE No significant findings 
Autonomy 
Failure 
Entropy Team Performance 
(Mission Level) 
System Initial (r = .276, p = .034) 
Peak (r = .260, p = .047) 
RMSE Team Performance 
(Mission Level) 
Vehicle Initial (r = .328, p = .014) 
Peak (r = .330, p = .013) 
















Vehicle Peak (r = -.374, p = .038) 
End (r = -.357, p = .048) 
System Initial (r = -.371, p = .040) 
Overcome Communication Initial (r = -.368, p = .039) 
Peak (r = -.377, p = .033) 
End (r = -.427, p = .015) 
RMSE Target Processing 
Efficiency (TPE) 
Communication Initial (r = -.522, p = .011) 
Peak (r = -.522, p = .011) 




Communication Initial (r = .512, p = .012) 
Peak (r = .513, p = .012) 








Entropy Target Processing 
Efficiency (TPE) 
System Initial (r = -.395, p = .028) 
Peak (r = -.400, p = .026) 




Control Initial (r = -.389, p = .031) 
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(Table 6 continued) 
Malicious 
Attack 
Entropy Team Performance 
(Mission Level) 
Vehicle Initial (r = -.521, p = .003)* 
Peak (r = -.532, p = .002)* 
End (r = -.437, p = .016) 
 Overcome System Initial (r = -.381, p = .035) 
Peak (r = -.400, p = .026) 
Vehicle Initial (r = -.356, p = .049) 
Peak(r = -.377, p = .037) 
RMSE Target Processing 
Efficiency (TPE) 
Vehicle Initial (r = -.410, p = .034) 
Peak (r = -.408, p = .035) 




Communication Initial (r = .521, p = .013) 
Peak (r = .520, p = .013) 
End (r = .509, p = .016) 
Overcome Vehicle End (r = -.431, p = .017) 
System Initial (r = -.464, p = .010) 
Peak (r = -.466, p = .009)* 
End (r = -.468, p = .009)* 
Note: Significant correlations of relaxation time metrics with outcome measures across all 
failure types (Automation, Autonomy, Communication Cut, System Power Down, 
Malicious Attack). Medium to large correlations are in bold, with asterisks denoting the 
following: *p < .01, **p < .001. 
 
For Experiment 2, we found medium to large correlations across four different 
layers for the autonomy failure, the hybrid failure, the system power down, and the 
malicious attack. It should be noted that there are 576 different correlations (same as 
Experiment 1 but with 6 failure types: 192 * 6 = 576) for a Bonferroni-corrected value of    
𝛼 =  
.05
576
 =   .00008.  Thus, I will focus on effect sizes as I did for Experiment 1. For the 
autonomy failure, I found medium, positive correlations of relaxation times with mission 
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level team performance score in the vehicle layer using RMSE. Within the hybrid failure, 
I found medium to large correlations with both TPE and GTRS. The correlations of 
relaxation time with TPE were negative, whereas the correlations of relaxation time with 
GTRS were positive. I found these correlations using RMSE and the communication layer. 
For entropy, I found similar correlations when I examined the relationship between 
performance (overcome) and the communication layer. This finding potentially indicates 
that communication reorganization is central for overcoming a more complicated type of 
failure that incorporates components of both automation and autonomy failures. 
 I also found medium to large correlations for the system failure (power down) and   
malicious attack failures. The system failure produced medium negative correlations 
between relaxation time and TPE (system layer) and GTRS (control layer) using the 
entropy measure. The malicious attack produced medium to large correlations across both 
dynamical system measures. For the entropy measure, there were negative correlations 
within the vehicle layer when correlating relaxation times with mission level team 
performance. For the RMSE measure, I found negative correlations within the vehicle layer 
when correlating relaxation times with TPE, and I also found negative correlations within 
the vehicle and system layers when correlating relaxation times with the binary overcome 
variable. Using this same RMSE measure, I also found positive correlations within the 
communication layer when correlating relaxation times with GTRS. This positive 
correlation was a similar finding of the GTRS score across both experiments and reveals 
difficulties with how this score was initially interpreted (i.e., resilience vs. robustness), 
which I will address in the Discussion section. 
4.4.2 Hypothesis 2 
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To test Hypothesis 2, I carried out the same type of analysis as for Experiment 1 by 
conducting a cluster analysis to identify low, medium and high performing clusters, 
calculating average entropy separated according to failure status, and running a split-plot 
ANOVA on average entropy values. However, due to the experimental design in which the 
failures differed according to mission, I ran a separate ANOVA  for each unique setup of 
failure types, such that I ran one ANOVA for Missions 2 & 3 (Automation & Autonomy 
Failures), one ANOVA for mission 4 (hybrid failures and communication cuts), and one 
ANOVA for mission 5 (system power down and malicious attacks). The other main 
adjustment to the analysis for Hypothesis 2 is that I included Training Condition as a 
between-subjects factor. Although this was not originally part of my hypothesis, I wanted 
to explore the effect of training. Thus, I carried out one 3 (Performance Cluster [Low, 
Medium, High]) × 3 (Failure Status [Nominal, Automation, Autonomy]) × 3 (Training 
Condition [Control, Coordination Coaching, Trust Calibration]) split-plot ANOVA per 
failure type setup. 
 Missions 2 and 3 had the same failures as Experiment 1, the Automation and 
Autonomy failures. There was no significant main effect of Training Condition (F (2, 107) 
= .309, p = .735), Performance Cluster (F (2, 107) = 1.443, p = .241), or their interaction 
(F (4, 107) = .140, p = .967)). The main effect of Failure Status was significant with a 
Greenhouse Geisser correction (F (1.936, 207.105) = 33.699, p < .001). Figure 9 displays 
this main effect. Using within-subjects contrasts and consistent with Experiment 1, I found 
that autonomy failures displayed significantly more reorganization compared to nominal 
status (F(1, 107) = 70.14, p < .001) and automation failures (F(1, 107) = 25.79, p < .001), 
and automation failures displayed significantly more reorganization than nominal status 
 41 
(F(1, 107) = 6.95, p = .010). The Failure Status*Performance Cluster interaction (F(3.871, 
207.105) = 4.952,  p = .001) was also statistically significant. 
 
Figure 9. Significant main effect of Failure Status from Experiment 2 for Missions 2 and 
3.  
 To examine the nature of the interaction effect (see Figure 10), I examined the 
within-subject contrasts. The contrast examining the differences in entropy 
(reorganization) between nominal status versus autonomy failure status, across different 
levels of Performance Cluster, was statistically significant (F(2, 107) = 9.61, p < .001). 
This suggests that during nominal times, medium performing teams display the least 
amount of reorganization (relative to low and high performing teams). However, there is 
the opposite effect during autonomy failures, in which medium performing teams display 
the greatest amount of reorganization. Additionally, the contrast examining the 
differences in reorganization between automation failure status versus autonomy failure 
status, across different levels of Performance Cluster, was also statistically significant 
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(F(2, 107) = 4.82, p = .010). This indicates a similar pattern. During automation failures, 
medium performing teams display the least amount of reorganization relative to low and 
high performing teams, but display the greatest amount of reorganization during 
autonomy failures. 
 
Figure 10. Significant Failure Status × Performance Cluster interaction from Experiment 
2 for Missions 2 and 3. 
 For mission 4, the assumption of sphericity was not met on the within-subjects 
variable of Failures Status (χ2 (2) = 66.382, p < .001), and I report Greenhouse-Geisser 
corrected statistics where applicable. There were no significant main effects of Failure 
Status, Training Condition, or Performance Cluster. However, there were significant 
interaction effects of Failure Status × Training Condition (F(2.629, 119.601) = 3.158, p = 
.033), and Failure Status × Training Condition × Performance Cluster (F(5.257, 119.601) 
= 2.560, p = .028). 
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 For the two-way interaction (Failure Status × Training Condition), there was one 
significant contrast. This contrast, F(2, 91) = 4.42, p = .015, compared nominal status to 
the communication cut failure across training condition. This significant contrast along 
with Figure 11 below shows that the coordination coaching and trust calibration 
conditions displayed lower reorganization relative to the control condition during the 
communication cut but coordination coaching had higher reorganization during nominal 
times. All other contrasts were not significant.  
 
Figure 11. Significant Failure Status × Training Condition Interaction from Experiment 2 
for Mission 4. 
 For the three way-interaction (Failure Status × Training Condition × Performance 
Cluster), there were two significant contrasts for the low performing cluster and one 
significant contrast for the medium performing cluster. The high performing cluster did 
not display any significant contrasts. The contrast comparing nominal status versus the 
hybrid failure across training condition was significant, F(4, 91) = 3.35, p = .013, and this 
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relationship was observed in the low performing cluster (see Figure 12), but not the 
medium or high performing teams. Upon examining the interaction graph, it appears that 
the level of reorganization was lower for teams trained in the trust calibration condition 
(compared to control and coordination coaching) during hybrid failures, but this 
difference was not present during nominal times. 
 
 
Figure 12. Significant Failure Status × Training Condition × Performance Cluster 
Interaction from Experiment 2 for Low Performing Teams in Mission 4. 
 The contrast comparing hybrid failure status versus communication cut failure 
status across training condition was significant, F(4, 91) = 2.64, p = .039, and this was 
observed in the low and medium performing teams. In the low performing cluster (see 
Figure 12, above), the teams trained in the trust calibration conditions displayed the 
lowest amount of reorganization during hybrid the failure, but this relationship did not 
hold during the communication cut failure. In the medium performing cluster (see Figure 
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13), the teams trained in the control condition displayed the highest amount of 
reorganization during the communication cut, but this did not hold during the hybrid 
failure. Finally, the interaction contrast was not significant for the high performing cluster  
(see Figure 14). 
 
Figure 13. Significant Failure Status × Training Condition × Performance Cluster 




Figure 14. High Performing Teams did not have a significant interaction contrast in the 
three-way interaction from Experiment 2 for Mission 4. 
 The Mission 5 ANOVA (system failure, malicious attack) did not yield any 
significant effects. To summarize my findings for Hypothesis 2, we do find that more 
reorganization occurs during autonomy and automation failures compared to nominal 
mission states, as observed in Experiment 1. As the complexity of the failures and 
training conditions increase, however, there are fewer clear-cut main effects and more 
interaction effects, such as those in Mission 4. While I observed that more reorganization 
does occur in response to failures compared to nominal mission status, I cannot conclude 
that this relationship was more pronounced for higher performing teams. 
4.4.3 Hypothesis 3 
I hypothesized that teams trained in the Coordination Coaching condition would 
display stronger, negative relationships between relaxation time and performance when 
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overcoming automation failures and teams trained in the Trust Calibration condition would 
display stronger, negative relationships between relaxation time and performance when 
overcoming autonomy failures. This is because the Coordination Coaching training 
condition was intended to help teams overcome automation failures, and the Trust 
Calibration training condition was intended to help teams overcome autonomy failures 
(Johnson et al., 2020). Thus, I examined how these differently trained teams’ relaxation 
times correlated with all performance metrics and GTRS (Table 7). 




















Communication Initial (r = .609, p = .003) 
Peak (r = .561, p = .007) 
End (r = .640, p = .001) 
RMSE No significant findings 
Autonomy 
Failure 
Entropy No significant findings 
RMSE Ground Truth 
Resilience 
Score 
Control Initial (r = -.509, p = 
.031) 
Peak (r = -.507, p = .032) 










Communication Initial (r = -.526, p = 
.037) 
Peak (r = -.522, p = .038) 
End (r = -.535, p = .033) 
RMSE Overcome Communication Initial (r = -.672, p = 
.004) 
Peak (r = -.673, p = .004) 
End (r = -.667, p = .005) 
Autonomy 
Failure 
Entropy No significant findings 
  RMSE No significant findings 
Note: Correlations split across training condition type. Medium to large correlations are 
in bold. 
It is apparent that the communication layer revealed how training effects are 
reflected in the resilience metrics. Of the four sets of significant correlations, three of them 
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occurred in the communication layer, with all the observed correlations being medium to 
large. One set was in the positive direction, mission level team performance score, while 
the other three were all in the hypothesized negative direction, with entropy and RMSE 
producing an identical number of significant correlations. 
4.4.4 Hypothesis 4 
As noted under Hypothesis 1, there were medium to large correlations present 
between relaxation time and GTRS. Specifically, all three time points displayed sizable 
correlations for the Hybrid failure using the RMSE measure in the communication layer. 
Additionally, there were medium to large correlations with GTRS for the Malicious Attack 
failure using the RMSE measure in the communication layer. Interestingly, there were 
positive correlations between GTRS and relaxation time, similar to Experiment 1.  
 To explore these positive correlations, I did a similar investigation of the TPE and 
GTRS values as for Experiment 1. Table 8 displays some sample scores for the Hybrid and 
Malicious Attack failures to demonstrate the relationship: 
Table 8. Hybrid Failures and Malicious Attack Sample Data 
 TPE on Failure TPE on Target 
Following Failure 
GTRS 
High Performance on 
Hybrid Failure 
948 927.65 -20.35 
Low Performance on 
Hybrid Failure 
725.15 880.08 154.93 
High Performance on 
Malicious Attack 
974.15 979.79 5.64 
Low Performance on 
Malicious Attack 
458.08 852.96 394.88 
Note: Sample data on TPE scores for Hybrid Failures and Malicious Attacks. Utilized to 
examine the relationship between GTRS and these failures. 
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Here we see the same pattern as in Experiment 1. That is, teams that perform well 
on the failure target are susceptible to receiving a low, or even negative, GTRS because 
they have no room for improvement on the subsequent target. However, teams that perform 
relatively poorly on the failure target are able to score high GTRS because they have room 
to improve on the subsequent target. Additionally, the correlation between TPE on the 
failure target and GTRS was statistically significant and negative for both the Hybrid 
Failure (r = -.669, p < .001) and Malicious Attack (r = -.755, p < .001). This negative 
correlation accounts for the opposite pattern of results (i.e., positive correlations with 
relaxation time) than was hypothesized. Therefore, Hypothesis 4 was not supported based 
on my initial assumptions. To summarize the results before the Discussion section, Table 
9 below summarizes all of my hypotheses. 
Table 9. Summary Table for All Hypotheses 
Hypothesis Takeaway Points 
1 Correlations were in 
the hypothesized 
(negative) direction 
Vehicle and system layers were important 
2 Similar reorganization 
across automation & 
autonomy failures 
More complexity with higher-level failures 
(e.g. hybrid, communication cut) 
3 Hypothesized 
(negative) relationship 
observed for Trust 
Calibration condition 
Communication layer was important 
4 GTRS may allow for 
different performance 
classifications 
The classifications included: resilient, robust, 
poor 




CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION 
The results of these resilience metrics for HATs operating within a RPAS environment 
are promising. I will discuss the implications of these findings within the context of the 
structure of the experiments, as well as interpreting them within the systems approach. 
Although I found many correlations which were significant at the .05 level, I will focus my 
discussion on those correlations and effect sizes of medium to large magnitudes. 
5.1 Hypothesis 1 
In Experiment 1, most of the medium to large correlations were found within the 
vehicle layer using the entropy metric with the TPE and GTRS performance measures. 
These findings support Hypothesis 1 (faster times will be associated with better 
performance). This indicates that there is a significant reorganization, as measured through 
entropy, during autonomy failures that is associated with resilient team level responses. 
The relationship with TPE was negative as hypothesized, but the relationship with GTRS 
was positive. Although these results of positive correlations do not support Hypothesis 4 
(faster times will be associated with an outcome intended to reflect a ground truth 
resilience), the findings are interesting and provide information about the relationship 
between GTRS and resilience. For instance, a large GTRS can actually be indicative of a 
resilient team who rebounded on the target after the failure after struggling during the 
failure itself. Conversely, a small GTRS can indicate a team that was both robust and 
resilient. This is because teams with high performance on both the target failure and 
subsequent target had low GTRS scores because the difference between the two scores was 
small, whereas teams with low performance on the target failure, but high performance on 
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the subsequent target had high GTRS scores because the difference was large. For both of 
the TPE and GTRS measures, the vehicle layer produced the largest correlations. 
Additionally, the system layer almost met the criteria for a medium effect size. 
 The importance of the vehicle and system layers for overcoming autonomy failures 
reflects the importance of the types of input variables included in these layers to 
overcoming complex autonomy failures.  For example, when overcoming an autonomy 
failure, the RPA vehicle is required to turn and adjust parameters (such as altitude and 
airspeed) regularly, so the nature of the task is more dependent on the vehicle and overall 
system layers. The ability to use the layered dynamics approach (Gorman et al., 2019) is a 
potential benefit to resilience engineering, which views teams as large systems containing 
interacting components with complex interactions (Hollnagel, Woods, & Leveson 2007). 
This approach can help to identify which components are key to resilience. 
In Experiment 2, the failures with the largest correlations were the hybrid failure, 
the system failure, and the malicious attack. Within the hybrid failure, the largest 
correlations were found when using the RMSE metric, although the entropy metric 
generated medium effect sizes as well. This indicates that the degree of novelty of 
reorganization is most important to measuring resilience for the complex types of failures 
in Experiment 2.  Thus, this suggests it is not just the amount of different states occupied 
by the system that is important, it is also how novel the reorganization behavior is across 
time that is important. It was found that TPE produced negative correlations while GTRS 
produced positive correlations. This finding is similar to what was found in Experiment 1 
and provides support for Hypothesis 1. Unlike Experiment 1, the communication layer was 
important for this relationship, potentially indicating that communication reorganization is 
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more important for more complex failures such as hybrid failures. Perhaps this type of 
failure is more likely to require teams to continually interact and adjust their activity, even 
more so than the regular autonomy and automation failures. For the system failure, I found 
medium, negative correlations with TPE and GTRS while using entropy. The system and 
control layers were important for this failure. 
The malicious attack failure also yielded medium to large correlations, including 
negative correlations with mission level team performance and overcome while using 
entropy. The vehicle and system layers were also important with these outcomes. Overall, 
my findings in Experiment 2 provide support for Hypothesis 1, because the majority of 
medium to strong correlations were in the hypothesized negative directions with the 
established outcome measures (TPE, Team Performance, Overcome). 
5.2 Hypothesis 2 
For Hypothesis 2, I hypothesized that teams would display more reorganization 
during failures than during non-failure (nominal) time segments and that this relationship 
would hold for higher performing teams. I only found support for the first half of this 
hypothesis. I found that teams exhibited more reorganization in response to automation and 
autonomy failures compared to nominal mission states in Experiment 1, and this was 
replicated in the first two missions of Experiment 2, which contained the same failures 
used in Experiment 1. However, more effective teams did not demonstrate a greater amount 
of reorganization during failures.  
Additionally, I found more complex interactions as the failures increased in 
complexity. For instance, in mission 4 of Experiment 2 I did not find greater reorganization 
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in response to hybrid failures and communications cuts (i.e. no main effect of Failure 
Status). However, I did find more interaction effects in response to these more complex 
failures. These interactions pertained to Training Condition and Failure Status across both 
Low and Medium Performing teams. These findings suggest that as failures increase in 
complexity, teams display more complex patterns of reorganization. In contrast to mission 
4, mission 5 had complex failures but did not have any significant effects. Future work 
could examine these relationships as failures increase in complexity. 
5.3 Hypothesis 3 
The presence of training effects in differentially trained teams were apparent and 
were found mostly in the communication and control layers. When examining the entropy 
measure, I found that the teams trained in the Coordination Coaching condition had a 
positive correlation between relaxation time and the mission level team performance score 
in the communication layer, whereas teams trained in the Trust Calibration condition had 
a negative correlation between relaxation time and TPE in the communication layer. This 
implies that communication reorganization was critical when overcoming failures, and the 
relationship between communication reorganization and performance differed depending 
on training condition.  
When examining the RMSE measure, the results indicated the importance of both 
the communication and control layers. Teams trained in the Coordination Coaching 
condition displayed a negative relationship with GTRS when overcoming autonomy 
failures. Teams trained in the Trust Calibration condition displayed a negative relationship 
with Overcome when overcoming automation failures. With respect to my hypotheses, that 
 54 
I would see pronounced correlations of relaxation times with performance outcomes 
respective to team training, I have evidence that this effect is present for automation, but 
not autonomy failures. That is, teams trained in the Coordination Coaching (automation) 
condition have medium to strong correlations when overcoming automation failures, but I 
did not see this effect with respect to autonomy failures for teams trained in the Trust 
Calibration (autonomy) condition. 
5.4 Hypothesis 4 
For Hypothesis 4, that larger values of the ground truth resilience score (GTRS) 
would be associated with faster relaxation times, I did not find support for this hypothesis. 
On the contrary, the medium to strong correlations between relaxation times and GTRS 
were largely in the positive direction. Upon initial examination, this would indicate that 
more time taken to achieve significant reorganization is correlated with better performance, 
but this is not entirely accurate. Performance may contribute to the GTRS, but it can also 
reflect robustness, or the ability to handle increasing complexity (Woods, 2015). A more 
accurate interpretation can be aided by a closer examination of how GTRS relates to the 
score on the affected target, as well as the score on the subsequent target. 
To explain the relationship between the two GTRS target scores, I first 
acknowledge that there are four possible outcomes (see Table 10) based on the way GTRS 
was initially defined. A team could display high performance on the failure target as well 
as the subsequent target. This is a high performing team and one that is both robust and 
resilient because they handled the complexity of the failure well. However, they would 
have a low GTRS of a small value or possibly negative. In this case, the GTRS would be 
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opposite of the TPE, which explains the negative correlations between TPE & GTRS. The 
second possibility is if a team performed well on the failure target but performed poorly on 
the subsequent target. This is a team that could be considered robust initially but not 
resilient, failing to perform on the next target. It is possible that they may have been 
affected by the failure target and it made it difficult to function afterwards, despite doing 
well on the failure itself.  
A third possibility is that a team may perform poorly on the failure target but 
rebound and perform well on the subsequent target. These teams would have a high GTRS 
and would be considered resilient. I initially hypothesized that this would be the most 
common occurrence, because I believed that most teams’ performance would suffer on the 
failure target, but resilient teams would respond quickly with a high score on the 
subsequent target. 








High High Zero (on average) Robust and resilient 
High Low Negative Robust initially, non-
resilient 
Low High Positive Resilient after failure 
Low Low Zero (on average) Poor 
Note: A description of four possible outcomes and corresponding performance 
classifications when measuring the GTRS. 
From a theoretical perspective, I incorporate systems theories related to this work, 
and theories related to resilience in the form of system reorganization, including Ashby’s 
control theory and cybernetics. Specifically, these results are rooted in the Law of Requisite 
Variety, which states that only “variety can destroy variety” (Ashby, 1957). In this case, 
“variety” refers to the number of possible unique system states that a control system can 
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take. For example, if a vector were to be [1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 3, 4, 4, 4, 4, 5], there would be five 
unique states, and the variety can be stated as a simple integer (five, in this case). In the 
case of an RPAS, there are many different unique combinations that can contribute to any 
state, making variety more complex. For example, [“left turn”, “pilot → navigator”, 
“switch battery”] is just one example of a system state that can be extracted using the 
layered dynamics approach. Thus, when I found a large amount of entropy or RMSE in 
these layers, this can be viewed as increased system variety in response to the increased 
variety introduced by the perturbed environment in the form of a failure. This works fits 
into the framework set forth by Ashby (1957) because I consistently found significant 
relationships between increased variety, as measured through significant reorganization 
using entropy and novelty using RMSE, and team performance under perturbed conditions, 
and that reorganization significantly increased in response to failure perturbations. These 
relationships between reorganization and performance indicate that timely dynamic variety 
is needed to deal with failures. 
Although there are many definitions of resilience in the literature (Woods, 2015; 
Hollnagel, Woods, & Leveson, 2007), as well as recommendations to practitioners on how 
to apply concepts of resilience engineering into their practice (Hollnagel, 2015), there is 
no method that can be used to objectively measure team resilience. Thus, the main 
contribution to the resilience engineering literature is measurement. I wanted to add an 
objective, testable method that can be used to benefit resilience engineering by using these 
resilience metrics. To accomplish this goal, I built on the work by Hoffman and Hancock 
(2017), which proposed a theoretical approach to measuring resilience, and applied their 
concepts to create a method to objectively measure resilience. Their proposal to measure 
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resilience as measuring the duration needed to recognize, design, and implement a change 
in response to a system failure inspired my method of measuring the time taken to initial, 
peak, and end times of significant reorganizations.  
Although I do not claim to have a strict, one-to-one match to their proposed 
measurement approach, the concept of defining resilience as the ability to overcome a 
failure and return to normal states rapidly and efficiently was inspired by the work of 
Hoffman and Hancock (2017). This work can also be tied to other concepts from resilience 
engineering. For instance, Woods (2015) defines four concepts of resilience. My work 
directly applies to one of these concepts, which is rebound from degraded conditions. I am 
directly measuring this rebound with the relaxation time metrics. The other two concepts 
which could be tied to my research are graceful extensibility, which is the ability of a 
system to extend its capacity in response to novel disturbances, and robustness, which is 
the ability to manage complexity in a timely way. Although I did not aim to measure these 
two concepts in this work, this approach would certainly apply to them. For example, I 
could measure graceful extensibility by examining the pattern of relaxation times across 
different failures. The final concept from Woods (2015) article is more long-term, 
sustained adaptability, which might be less amenable to the analyses presented here. 
Despite this, there is reason to believe this work is encouraging and has the potential to 
contribute objective metrics to the field of resilience engineering. 
Overall, the results across these two studies appear promising with respect to 
generating dynamic systems-based resilience metrics. More rapid reorganization tends to 
be associated with greater performance, and the sublayers can be used to identify sources 
of rapid responses and resilient behavior. 
 58 
 
5.5 Limitations and Future Directions 
One way to follow up on this work would be to address the number of correlations 
in the study in a way that would generate more informative results. As previously noted, 
due to the number of layers, failures, relaxation time measures, and performance and GTRS 
measures, there is a very large number of correlations, many of which were not even 
interpreted. In the future, it will be beneficial to use more advanced statistical techniques 
such as clustering or factor analytic approaches to condense these correlations into a more 
parsimonious picture of how resilience relates to team effectiveness. 
Additionally, more conceptual work is needed on the two dynamical system 
measures I used – entropy and RMSE- and the ways in which they describe system 
response and real-time system behavior.  Entropy describes the system response in terms 
of the number of possible arrangements occupied by the system during any window of 
time. This would be analogous to increased variety of system states following Ashby’s 
(1957) concept of requisite variety. Conversely, RMSE may capture system response in 
terms of the novelty of the deviation from a predicted trajectory based on the history of the 
time series. Thus, both measures quantify team reorganization and can be used to for real-
time analyses of system responses, but differ in how they represent reorganization. 
Although this paper scratches the surface of the interpretation of these measures in the 
context of team adaptation and resilience, future work should focus on clarifying these 
concepts. 
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Future directions in resilience metrics could disentangle these two measures based 
on their respective explanations of a system response. For example, future work could 
determine if training effects vary systematically across either entropy (variety; 
reorganization) or RMSE (novelty) beyond the set of findings from the current 
experiments. Another future direction could be filtering out sources of variation, such as 
team members or sublayers, to identify which are critical for reorganization and novelty in 
a team response (e.g., Gorman et al., 2020). For example, we could filter the control layer 
from the overall system layer to determine if significant correlations between relaxation 
time and performance persist across the other layers. 
5.6 Conclusion 
It is my hope that this work can influence the training and assessment of RPAS teams, 
as well as other teams in other sociotechnical contexts, which work in complex 
environments that are susceptible to system failures, errors, and crises. This work is 
beneficial in many situations in which team flexibility, preventive behavior, and resilience 
are critical. Additionally, the metrics developed in this work have potential for real-time 
analysis. These real-time applications can benefit the training of more resilient teams, such 
as the possibility of providing real-time feedback and guidance during training and 
simulations, as well as understanding how teams reorganize themselves to maintain high 
levels of effectiveness during anomalous events (Gorman et al., 2020; Grimm et al., 2017). 
Real-time analysis may also enable analysts and operators in RPAS environments to 
become more effective in the detection of maladaptive team behaviors. I hope that these 
applications benefit team training by making it more responsive by alerting trainers and 
other evaluators to the onset and time course of reorganization events. Taken together, I 
 60 
propose that these measurement approaches will help inform and generate new teamwork 
measurement, monitoring, and assessment strategies in work domains in which dynamic 

















The following images show the pilot (AVO), navigator (DEMPC), and photographer 
(PLO) screens during the System Failure. The screens fail and go out in 30 sec. segments 
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